Produktbeschreibung
In August 1914, at the beginning of the First World War, Russia faced Germany and Austria-Hungary in the eastern theatre of operations; here war began with two distinct campaigns being fought concurrently.
In the north a hasty Russian invasion of Eastern Prussia culminated in a decisive German victory.
In the south the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian and Russia armed forces clashed in a series of running battles that became known as The Great Battle for Galicia.
1914, Twilight in the East attempts to simulate this incredible campaign of multiple operations in a moderately complex game. The design uses a brand new game system which highlights those aspects of warfare that made the opening stages of WWI so unique. With both sides being able to attack, the game is exciting and gives wonderful insights into one of the most important campaigns of the twentieth century.
The Russian plan of campaign provided for an immediate general offensive, without waiting for the arrival of belated troops from the interior of the country. This was a striking expression of the strategical fallacy then in vogue in the general staffs of Russia and France that the offensive was the only way of conducting war. The result was the decision to attack the armies of the Central Powers at all points, without waiting for the complete concentration of the Russian forces. The task detailed to the armies of the South-West Front was "to defeat the Austro-Hungarian armies, with a view to preventing the retreat of any considerable number of the enemy southwards, over the Dniester, or westwards, towards Krakau (71.81)." Thus we see that the plan made a maximum demand on the South-West Front. The task was not only to rout, but to surround the Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia.
Military historical experience shows that for an operation of this kind to be successful, either an immense superiority in quality or technique is needed, or a considerable superiority of numbers. The Russian planners had no grounds, before the war, to count on any enormous superiority of quality or technique of the Russian over the Austro-Hungarian army. So there was only one way out - to secure a great superiority of numbers. Meanwhile, according to the Russian General Staff's own calculation, Austria-Hungary by the fifteenth day of mobilization would concentrate in Galicia from 43 to 47 divisions of infantry. It is evident that the task allotted to the South-West Front did not correspond with the relative forces of the opposing sides.
The disproportion of forces to tasks was a characteristic feature of the Russian and French plans of campaign. This defect was already apparent in the strategical deployment of the South-West Front, which presented a "cordon" 450 km. long. The chief striking wing was the right, as the main lines of communication of the Austro-Hungarian armies concentrated in Galicia went westwards, to Krakau; besides, the operative union of the Austro-Hungarians with the Germans was most easily achieved along the routes going westwards. Meanwhile, the above table shows that the right flank of the Russian Army, the 4th, was precisely the weakest.
In 1909-12 Russian secret intelligence had succeeded in obtaining documentary data concerning the points of concentration proposed by the Austro-Hungarian plan of campaign . These documents indicated that all the forces detailed against Russia were to be deployed east of the San (51.74 - 41.87). The possession of this information tempted the Russian Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, and his colleagues, to draw up his plan so as to aim all the Armies of the South-West Front on a concentric offensive against Lvov (Lemberg). This plan was a bad one, for Sukhomlinov had no grounds whatever to suppose that the initiative would remain in the hands of the Russians; the Austro-Hungarians would be ready first, and would thus have the "choice of the field of battle". Besides, the Austro-Hungarian General Staff might change the points of concentration; and then the Russian plan would fall flat.
So, indeed, it turned out. In the summer of 1914 the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, General Conrad von Hötzendorf, foreseeing a war with Serbia, made considerable changes in the plan of deployment of his armies. Intending to begin his operations by a decisive offensive in a northern direction between the San and the Bug (60.49 - 25.82), he concentrated the main mass of the Austro-Hungarian forces along the San - that is to say, much further west than the Russians expected. These were the 1st and 4th Armies. To cover them from the Russians advancing from Dubno (11.79), the 3rd Army was located about Lvov and Sambor (38.91). The Army Group Kövesz (parts of the 2nd Army) was deployed still further east, with the task of covering the deeper rear from the Russians advancing from Proskurov (offmap via 01.91) and further south. Finally, to secure the left wing of the main forces at Krakau, was to be assembled the Army Group of General Kummer. His task was to form an operative link with the German corps of General Woyrsch, who was advancing from Posen (98.47) in the direction of the Vistula.
Complexity Level and Solitaire Suitability: Medium
One map hex = 5 miles per hex
Unit size(s) = Primarily Divisional with some independent brigades
One Game Turn = 2 to 3 days
Number of players = 1 to 6
Average Playing Time:
small scenario 4-8 hours, large scenario 10-16 hours, campaign 25 to 35 hours
COMPONENTS:
- 5 maps (3 full 22"x34", 1 14"x34, 1 8"x34)
- 8 counter sheets
- rulebook
- scenario/playbook
- 11 player aid cards
- full color turn record track
- 4 dice (two white, one black, one red) |